# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC — FW

#### A. Interpretation and Definitions: The affirmative should have to defend that the end goal of the 1AC is that the USFG should expand the scope of the United States’ core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### The United States federal government is the three branches in D.C.

US Legal 19 (“USLegal is the legal destination site for consumers, small business, attorneys, corporations, and anyone interested in the law, or in need of legal information, products or services.” “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition” Copyright 2019. <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>) // immanuel

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; **all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.**

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### B. Violation: The aff refuses engagement with the state. The aff’s method doesn’t call for USfg action in the area of antitrust — they don’t call for institutional change from the status quo.

#### C. Reason to prefer

#### 1. Method Specific Education Good – Specific method debates designed to produce political change to the status quo - allow left v left debates to weigh potential benefits and consequences of methods or political actions from within the leftist frame. Makes us better decision-makers around leftist politics, key to leftist advocacy skills and political planning. We must understand the complexity of internal operations of the state to guide tactics and strategies designed to produce material change. Debate can train activists and organizers on how to act against the state that forces the state into stances or actions contrary to its self-interest.

#### 2. Cede the political DA: Radical demands require concrete proposals. Absent an institutional method radical demands serve white elite interests.

Love 2020 [Dayvon, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle and 2008 CEDA Champion, “The Colonization of ‘Radical Politics’,” https://lbsbaltimore.com/the-colonization-of-radical-politics/?fbclid=IwAR00hZHKZgmUNvVYL54oES2L7NxPeHzB\_HH7EFOpI7Thw1ND0sc-JM6cZLI//ak47]

White liberals are not accountable to Black people. White people often construct and advocate for their ideas of the course of action that Black people should take without having to deliver any significant material change to the lives of Black people. Particularly in the academy, and in activist spaces, ideas like the socialist revolution, armed struggle, and ending civil society can be advocated without any expectation that you can/will accomplish these objectives or that you are accountable for the consequences for advocating these positions. In other words, one can claim to be radical because they advocate the abolition of prisons, make commentary on social media about it, and participate in panel discussions. Yet this self-proclaimed ‘radical’ prison abolitionist may not have a comprehensive vision of what an alternative social arrangement would look like, have an ability to effectively influence politics/policy in that direction or have a relationship with organized groups of people who are incarcerated. I am not saying that only people with these conditions should advocate for prison abolition. Rather, that without those conditions, any activity or advocacy to this end is simply an expression of a strong opinion and not radical political activity. Only people with tremendous privilege can speak publicly about empowering Black people while maintaining a livelihood disconnected from the condition of Black people and relatively insulated from the consequences of advocating radical political positions. I want to be clear that the use of the prison abolition example is not a critique of the national conversation about prison abolition. I use this example to characterize the way that folks in the Baltimore-Metro area have taken a legitimate radical political perspective and have participated in its commodification. Given my level of involvement with political activity in Baltimore, I can speak on this phenomena with a high degree of credibility. I will provide specific examples later on in the piece. The privilege of being able to make radical sounding political pronouncements or gestures without any expectation that you will have to bring those demands to fruition is the basis for the revolutionary fantasies that are most prominent in the academy, social media, and amongst professional organizers. The calls to burn the system down and start a revolution are only possible when you don’t actually have the expectation that you will have to make good on these declarations. It trivializes the level of sacrifice it took for those in the Black Radical Tradition who actually did take up arms and paid the ultimate price. It is an insult to the Black Liberation Army, The Deacons of Defense, the Mau Mau, and many others when folk claim the radicalism of violent confrontations with the state without having to actually make the level of sacrifice that our ancestors made. There are many political prisoners who have spent their entire lives in jail because of their sacrifice and others that are now dead. I am not saying that we should not put these ideas on the table for political conversation, but to claim these radical politics without any real ability to carry out these ideas is an act of commodifying radical politics that is inauthentic and politically dishonest. This doesn’t just apply to some of the more revolutionary kinds of activity that I mentioned earlier, this also applies to issues like politics and public policy. In the academy, someone can advocate a militant political position on criminal justice without having to be accountable for making it happen or being accountable for the actual consequences of that policy. In some ways, this is good if it serves the purpose of testing ideas to be used politically. It becomes a problem when an organization advocates a position that they don’t have the ability to execute. Organizations of this nature are like mannequins wearing the garments of revolutionary discourse, in the shopping mall of the non-profit industrial complex. Additionally, political advocacy that is authentically radical requires a base, and as it relates to Black Liberation, a Black base that is substantially working-class and diverse. The ideas alone are not enough to be truly radical. There must be a majority Black base that is composed of real Black bodies, not symbols of interaction in cyberspace. And the base should not be composed primarily of white people. A good example of this in Baltimore is the People’s Power Assembly (PPA). The organization’s stated goal is “to empower workers and oppressed people to demand jobs, education & healthcare while fighting against racist police terror, sexism, LGBTQ and ableist oppression.” The organization is best known for leading demonstrations in Baltimore, particularly during times of major unrest. Their most visible leader is a white woman and many of the organizations in Baltimore that advocate for policies that would benefit the masses of Black people barely know that PPA exist. They have no major policy or organizing victories that they can legitimately claim and have not demonstrated an ability to influence local policy. However, they receive some coverage in local media because of their ability to draw attention to themselves by making radical political proclamations. In fact, on Monday June 8th 2020 at a rally that they convened outside of city hall, their leader, Sharon Black, made the claim that defunding police means “not a penny goes to the police department” and described this as her organization’s political objective. She goes on to say their goal is to accomplish that policy objective within a year. This is a radical proclamation, but PPA has very little ability to actually bring this into fruition. The policy work that it would take to accomplish this goal and the alternative community safety infrastructure that would need to be developed to make this happen in a year is just fantasy. This does not make PPA bad people, but this is not radical political activity, it is revolutionary fantasy. When you look them up online there is no clear sense of who to hold accountable, which tells me that they are more of a brand than an organized political organization. There are many so-called radical organizations like PPA that claim radical political objectives but do not have a way to execute on these objectives and also don’t have a majority Black base that consistently supports their work. They are mere brands of revolutionary posturing that contribute to an echo chamber of leftists political impotence. I have observed in Baltimore some Black people who have some level of familiarity with Black radical political literature (and in many cases, just the buzzwords that are commonly recited on social media) and start organizations or develop platforms based on Black radical ideas and expect to recruit Black people to their efforts. What ends up happening is that most of their base ends up being comprised of white liberals and progressives that frequent places like Red Emmas, Station North, Maryland Institute College of Art (MICA), or Impact Hub. Additionally, the Black people that are typically in those formations are non-profit professionals or other Black people who have social, professional and political networks that are very white (this is not a moral judgement on these Black folks, it is a statement of the nature and culture of their networks). What is buried under the radical rhetoric is deeply anti-Black approaches to community organizing that ultimately drive Black people away. In radical political literature, there is often a call for “educating the masses” as it relates to efforts at community organizing. The nexus between the call for educating the masses and the general notion of Black inferiority that is ubiquitous in American Civil society creates a dynamic where Black people who are politically and intellectually uninitiated in the canon of radical politics are understood to be people that need to be lectured to about their perceived un-enlightenment. Black people are often lectured to by activists and community organizers about all the stuff that they need to learn, all the stuff that is wrong with the world, and are told what they need to do to address our issues. Embedded in this is the assumption that there aren’t Black people who already know our current reality, or who are already working to address these issues, or who just disagree. This does not mean that political education is not important, but it is a notion that is often abused by people who use it as an opportunity to demonstrate their perceived intellectual or moral superiority over “the masses.” Additionally, Black people have been subjected to the advocacy of activists and community organizers who call themselves radical yet have not demonstrated an ability to deliver any material results to them. For these reasons, Black people are not inclined to support people like that. Black people who are not predisposed to social justice and activist culture are a tough crowd and for good reason. You don’t get to be credible with any substantial population of Black people without demonstrating an ability to both build relationships beyond an advocacy campaign and an ability to impact their lives. The masses of Black people do not have the luxury of making radical political declarations without being held accountable for it. White people are a much easier crowd. They don’t have to actually be accountable to Black people for who they support or the consequences of their advocacy; as long as their board of directors or shareholders are satisfied they can mostly do what they want. They often promote Black people who espouse ideas that reflect the centrality of European intellectual traditions. They elevate Black people who feed their negrophillic, sadomasochistic fetishes for the consumption of Black images of spectacle and suffering. Mary Helen Washington in her compilation of Zora Neale Hurston’s writings called “I Love Myself When I am Smiling and Then Again When I Look Mean” says: Lippincott, rejected her proposal for a book on the lives of upper-class blacks. In the essay “What White Publishers Won’t Print,” written in 1950 for Negro Digest, Hurston indicates her belief that the racist American publishing industry was uninterested in the “average struggling non-morbid Negro,” because there was more money to be made exploiting the race problem with stereotyped stories of simple, oppressed sharecroppers. Mary Helen Washington, in her compilation of Zora Neale Hurston’s writings called “I Love Myself When I am Smiling and Then Again When I Look Mean” says: Lippincott, rejected her proposal for a book on the lives of upper-class blacks. 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An organization or effort that is reliant on, and whose most consistent support comes from non-Black people and white adjacent Black people, is not radical. It is a caricature of Black Liberation. The psychology of imposter syndrome and injected oppression The psychological, cultural, and spiritual impacts of Enslavement remains very present in the collective existence of Black people in America. It manifests in the way that Black people have adopted the societal belief of our worthlessness. One of the things that I learned from an excellent training with the AYA Institute and its Warrior Healer Builder Collective is that we often use the things that we do to affirm our worth as human beings, instead of acknowledging our inherent worth as people. This is not something that is exclusive to Black people, but with us, it is exacerbated by the societal propaganda regarding the belief in our inherent inferiority. The result of this dynamic is widespread insecurity. Many of us are terrified at confronting our weaknesses because it would inflame fears of our own inadequacies. Given the toxicity of our collective experiences of Enslavement, we are prone to exert violence against other Black people as a function of our struggle with self-worth. Organizing amongst Black people is hard because we often have to endure these toxic conditions that are not financially lucrative. This is why investing in our collective healing is so important, because it has real implications on our ability to organize in a self determined way. As a person who has organized primarily amongst Black people, doing the work to move through the toxicity that are the residues of Enslavement in a healthy way is essential to truly build Black Power. It is much easier to organize amongst white people who are prone to a paternalistic attitude that prioritizes a Black person’s passion and feelings over an actual willingness to be accountable to Black people and secure material improvements in our collective of quality of life. Also, it is more financially lucrative to spend a lot of time proximate to white people and their institutions. White people also have the ability to create platforms for Black people that can elevate them to leadership without having been immersed in Black life. Being truly radical means valuing Black formations that are not highly esteemed by white institutions, and seeing them as a source of power. This means that those afterschool programs led by Black people, football coaches, small business owners, local artists, etc are more important than the credibility that comes from being affiliated with philanthropy, or celebrities, or academics. This is truly a sacrifice because this approach does not lend itself to making money to sustain a quality livelihood. Additionally, it forces an organizer to test their ability to bring along people who may not agree with them. For instance, one of the issues that many so-called radical activists and organizers fail to address is the issue of gun violence and homicide in places like Baltimore. The lack of concern about this issue among people who call themselves radicals is a shortcoming in their political analysis. Black elders that live in communities plagued by violence don’t have the luxury of waiting for the end of capitalism to live in a safe environment. As a person who believes in the goal of abolishing prisons and the police state, I am also clear that this won’t happen overnight, and requires a tremendous amount of infrastructure development to make this happen. In light of that, it becomes important to advocate for reforms that can address some of the immediate issues like the ability for people to be safe in their neighborhoods, which are also steps in the direction of police and prison abolition. For example, LBS has advocated for a decrease in the police budget, and an increase in investments in grassroots, community-based anti-violence programs. The more that the police budget decreases, and the more effective community-based anti-violence programs are at demonstrating their ability to address violence, the closer we can get to police abolition. The point here is that being radical is not just about advocating a radical position. It is about being able to organize around the concrete issues that Black people face, delivering results that impact people’s lives, and building a base of Black people that allows for true Black autonomy and confrontation of white corporate power. This also helps to move our community in the direction of police abolition because they are able to see the benefits of that perspective in their lives. The true metric for an organization or individual being radical is their ability to make powerful institutions make substantive concessions that meaningfully undermine their power and as a result, puts more power in the hands of the masses of Black people. Being disruptive in rhetoric or actions does not constitute being radical. White people have an interest in the latter as a metric for radicalism because it allows them the appearance of anti-racism, without giving up any power. They can elevate Black people who are superficial disruptors, sell them to the public as an advocate for social justice, and marginalize those who are interested in actually shifting power into the hands of Black people. This is how white liberals have colonized the term “radical.” They have striped the term of having a meaning that is directly connected to concrete transformation of the global system of white supremacy and oppression. Being radical is fundamentally about confronting and shifting power. Any definition of radical where that is not central, ill-serves our community. Being radical should mean things like one or more of the following: You have substantial military capability that can be used against the state or white corporate power. You can mobilize large numbers of people to participate in actions in the absence of a national media context (like widespread social unrest) that meaningfully disrupt white corporate, institutional, government or commercial activity. You can meaningfully and consistently influence public policy against the interest of white corporate power. The ability to produce widespread propaganda that can influence public opinion against the interest of white corporate power. Removing the power of white institutions to control the organizations that are tasked with the socialization of Black youth.

#### 3. Critical Switch Side Debate is Good and key to all your offense –SSD proves hard left affs can be both topical and anti the state and civil society. Conviction Based Debate (CBD) results in debates where the debaters have already decided their position in debate and the world such that we do not consider our relationship to Others. It produces insular debates that destroy education, ethics and reproduces the violence they critique

### 1NC — K — University

#### Using University debate spaces as a forum for criticism merely reifies and legitimates the University as a colonialist institution

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Because the university is a fundamentally colonial institution, decolonization would require more than these self-serving half measures and instead, transforming its essential nature. As with all institutions, such transformation targets the university’s material dependency upon colonial exploitation, as well as its integration within and service to the settler state. For the university in particular however, we must attend to the colonialist ideology animating its knowledge functions. But without this, what remains of the university? Its research methods and methodologies, as well as knowledge packaging, sale, and institutionalization would have to be redirected from their current exploitative and repressive formulas (Smith, 2012; Simpson, 2014). Moreover, if we divest the university of its assumed authority over knowledge, what purpose does it serve? And upon whose authority does it act? In short, decolonization requires the university to become a totally new entity, vested with a new mission, organization, practices, and responsibilities. However, we realize that such comprehensive reform is not practically viable. The university is skilled in inhibiting structural reform. It does so not by simply dismissing or ignoring criticism, but by becoming ‘vigilant in its negligence’ (Moten & Harney, 2004, p. 106), incorporating critique nominally and adopting the appearance of sympathy, thereby circumventing a decolonial confrontation. In its vigilance, the university performs what Tuck and Yang (2012) term settler moves to innocence (p. 9), stratagems which, in the pretense of critical self-reflection, divert decolonial transformation into salvaging settler futurity and conscience. Swarthmore, for example, regularly employs "collections," convening the campus body, especially in response to an incident, inviting all attendees to speak. These gatherings demonstrate to a larger audience that the school is sensitive to campus concerns, that they are willing to give students and community members the space to express themselves, but without creating any responsibility to act upon those sentiments. In fact, the equal privilege afforded to all speakers, regardless of relations of power and personal benefit, makes the supposedly democratic space of the collection a venue for university representatives to discredit student and faculty concerns. Even when a school does sincerely critique its own coloniality, this “dialogue” is still undertaken for the purposes of absolvement and self-preservation rather than the restoration of indigenous sovereignty (Byrd, 2011). And as this nominal call for reform has become professional academic practice, the university reaffirms the necessity of its own existence through those who would question it (Moten & Harney, 2004). Thus the critical academic is made complicit in the institution’s negligence, locked into the university’s attempts to become amenable to those it oppresses. To be critical of the university traps one within settler futurity. And so, we, from our different positions, reject the desire for inclusion, for a more critically engaged university. Rather than confront an institution that will not, indeed cannot, recognize indigenous sovereignty, we seek self-recognition and indigenous modes of life independent of this settler apparatus (Coulthard, 2014). We acknowledge that the only possible relationship to the university is a criminal one (Moten & Harney, 2004), that those of us who survive the institution have a responsibility to betray it and appropriate its resources for our peoples (Fanon, 2005).

#### Criticism from within the University structure refies racism

Andrews 16 Kehinde Andrews is professor of black studies at Birmingham City University. I compared universities to slave plantations to disturb, not discourage, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/24/universities-slave-plantations-racist

As places of critical thought, universities have the allure of being incubators for progressive ideals. Student movements and academic developments such as feminism and black studies play into this mythical notion. The reality is, however, that until the 1960s, less than 5% of the population went to university and they were bastions of white, male privilege. In the 18th century, the botanist Carl Linnaeus, in his System Naturae, outlined the hierarchy of being, with Europaeus Albus (white) at the top and Afer Niger (black), firmly at the bottom. It is no coincidence that he has a university in Sweden named after him. My colleague Nathaniel Coleman highlighted the role of Francis Galton at UCL promoting the eugenics movement; and racial “science” was a key Nazi justification for the Holocaust. Deepa Naik perfectly summed up the universities’ role in society when she argued at last year’s NUS black students’ conference that “the university is not racist, it is racism”. The reason I invoked Audre Lorde’s metaphor of the university as the “master’s house” was as a challenge to academics. We cannot assume that just because the student body has become more diverse since the 60s that the role of universities has changed. Other presenters on the day highlighted the inequalities present in universities: from staff experiences of being ignored or mistaken for the cleaner, to prospective ethnic minority students being warned off applying to elite universities because they would not fit in. The exclusionary curriculum, bought to the fore by the student-led campaign “Why is my curriculum white?” also featured prominently in the day. If we understand the university as the master’s house, then the institutional racism embedded in universities does not come as a surprise. If the university is racism, then of course the experience within it will be exclusionary. For an academic concerned with overcoming racial inequality, this poses a very serious challenge. In class when I taught these concepts, one of my students diagnosed my role as that of the “overseer”, maintaining the system of racial oppression. This jarring metaphor serves as a reminder of the institutional role of universities, which I can do little to alter. The inequalities in the school system affect who achieves the grades to attend; students who do make the grade are charged £9,000 a year and the government just replaced maintenance grants for the poorest students with loans. Universities assign credentials to graduates that justify their place in the social order; however, the likelihood of achieving the “best” degree, from the “top” institutions is too heavily influenced by class and race to even resemble a meritocracy. Instead, the result is a system that reproduces the inequalities in society. The nature of academia is that career advancement is achieved by attending conferences and writing papers for other academics, creating a self-referential bubble where our critical knowledge gets trapped within the university. The separation of thought from action, of university from the social world, is a key way that inequalities are maintained. The academic industrial complex creates institutional forms as real and discriminatory as those that exist in the police force, which we are quick to condemn. If the university is the master house, then we are among the tools that maintain the edifice.

#### The inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to endless imperial warfare and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

#### Even if the aff’s *demands* are radical, their presentation is not --- forwarding [] is a constraining affective investment that reduces aff solvency and legitimizes violence

Lundberg 12

(Christian Lundberg, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies and Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina, PhD in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, p. 174-177)

Thus, "as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!" At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students' call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gerard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the "hysteric ... cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own .... [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge .... [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition-being put under pressure to answer a question.T'" Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes nanling in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation betweenjouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics. On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One's Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. "Danger" functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors' imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand's rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus's interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state's love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject's marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state's actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the "politics of policy and public debate.":" Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of "theory" and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state's refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal "no." Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds, Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: "demand in itself ... is demand of a presence or of an absence ... pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied."46

**Vote negative to theorize form AND content specifically in the context of refusal --- a focus on debate and the ballot reproduces a focus on individual inducements to further justify inclusion within debate, making solvency predicated off being complicit in a colonized space**

**Grande 2018**

(Sandy Grande, Professor at Connecticut College, “Refusing the University”, 2018, <https://www.academia.edu/37026360/Refusing_the_University>)

In the broader field of critical theory, the work of Marcuse (1964) is central to theorizations of refusal. His central argument is that in modern capitalist societies— where worth is equated with the “reproduction of value” and “extraction of profit”— human beings only exist as “an instrumental means” of capital and, within this context, “simply to exist, to be, is an act of refusal” (Garland, 2013, p. 376). As such, refusal should not be confused with “passive withdrawal or retreat” but rather understood as an active instantiation of “a radically different mode- of- being and mode- of- doing” (p. 375). Frank Wilderson (2003) troubles the capitalist foundation of refusal from the standpoint of Black subjectivity. Specifically, in distinction to what he refers to as the “coherent” subjects of anti- capitalist struggle (e.g., the worker, the immigrant, the woman), Wilderson posits the “incoherence” of Black subjects (i.e., the unwaged slave, the prison slave) as destabilizing, as “the unthought” of historical materialism (pp. 21– 22). He writes: Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous…not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialectic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm a “program of complete disorder.” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26) Within this context, Black refusal is theorized as “an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation)” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26). Taking into account the power relations of both capitalism and white supremacy, Indigenous scholars posit refusal as a positive stance that is: less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition… and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure… a radical alternative to the structural and psycho- affective facets of colonial domination. (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456) In this way, Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes refusal as distinct from resistance in that it does not take authority as a given. More specifically, at the heart of the text, she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic. In response, she develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’ ” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production. Gómez- Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), “capitalist settler states prefer resistance” because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system and is therefore more dangerous. While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser. For example, refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self- worth. Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.16 And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic “rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition- based politics can have even deeper consequences. As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co- resistance. The prospect of coalition re- raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state? Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti- racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),17 whether anti- racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land- based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy, racial slavery, and antiblackness. Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co- resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/ and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal— as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects. Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of the undercommons as a space of possibility: a fugitive space wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land- based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence; a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land. Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co- resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti- capitalist, feminist, anti- colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices— plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university: First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity— to sta2ging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements— particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self- promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self— which means it is not about promotion and tenure— it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor. Second, we must commit to reciprocity— the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish- or- perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds. Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital— that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. Inherent to a land- based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter- generational resurgence and transformation. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative. Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a nom de guerre— like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”18 If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un- demand, the un- desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

#### The alternative is to reject claims of solvency from their critique—to disrupt and rupture discourses of progress

Ladoen 21 Shannon Lodoen, PhD student in English and Rhetoric at the University of Waterloo, JoMR 4.2 Progress and Power in the First, Second, and Third Universities A Case Study of the University of Waterloo, <http://journalofmultimodalrhetorics.com/files/documents/248e1a2f-2932-44a9-91af-9a240f1cd37f.pdf>

The Third University Self-Actualizes (and then Self-Destructs) As I warned in my introduction, it is often hard to pinpoint spaces of the third university; as paperson (2017) notes in his conclusion, it is constantly assembling, constantly in a state of coming together, and yet also constantly “expiring” or losing its foothold (p. 52). In this sense, it does not subscribe to the same notions of linear progress that undergird the first and second universities. It is used to backsliding, having to change tack and move laterally; it is adaptable and resilient, and will not be stopped even when particular avenues are shut down or altered. paperson also notes that the third university “assembles decolonizing machines out of scrap parts from colonial technology. It makes itself out of assemblages of the first and second world universities” (p. 53). Essentially, it must use elements of the first and second universities in new ways, taking advantage of various loopholes or situations to push its decolonizing agenda; it does not aim for progress, as such, but for change, disruption, and rupture. It recognizes that “change” is not always necessarily for the better, but that change in some form must occur in order to decolonize the university. It also recognizes that changes are not permanent (as linear narratives of progress would suggest) but can fall apart or disperse as their need expires or new avenues arise.36 Thus, it also implicitly recognizes the importance of individual and collective labouring towards a common goal of decolonization, although this labour is often difficult and unacknowledged (and even challenged) by the institution where it takes place.

**Communicative capitalism makes violence inevitable**

**Wiltgen 5**

(James Wiltgen, Professor of History and Critical Theory at CalArts, "Sado-Moneatrism or Saint Fond – Saint Ford", in Consumption in the Age of Information, ed. Cohen and Rutsky, BERG, New York, p. 107-110)

How does digital capitalism intertwine with the concept of uncertainty? What key changes have taken place in the structuring of the world, via the digital and the biotechnological, what forces have emerged or coalesced, and ﬁnally, how do they affect the realm of subjectivity and consumption? Here, Arthur Kroker has transposed McLuhan into the twenty-ﬁrst century, performing an interrogation of what he calls the “digital nerve,” basically the exteriorization of the human sensorium into the digital circuitry of contemporary capitalism (Kroker, 2004: 81). This (in)formation, “streamed capitalism,” rests not exclusively on exchange value, nor material goods, but something much more immaterial, – a post market, post biological, post image society where the driving force, the “will to will,” has ushered in a world measured by probability. In other words, this variant of capitalism seeks to bind chaos by ever-increasing strictures, utilizing an axiomatic based on capture and control, with vast circuits of circulation as the primary digital architecture. This system runs on a densely articulated composition, similar to the earlier addressed concept of sado-monetarism, based upon extensive feedback loops running between exchange value and abuse value. This assemblage, however, has multiple levels, and not all are connected to the grid at the same speeds; a number of different times exist within this formation, including digital time, urban time, quotidian time, transversal time, etc. Spatially, the structure relies not on geography but “strategic digital nodes” for the core of the system, and connectivity radiates out from these nodal points (Kroker, 2004: 125). For example, a key site for these points would be the Net corporation, deﬁned as “as a self-regulating, self- reﬂexive platform of software intelligence providing a privileged portal into the digital universe” (Kroker, 2004: 140). Indeed, his mapping of digital capitalism has clear parallels with the shifts Katherine Hayles analyzes, in particular the underlying, driving mechanism whereby information severs itself from embodiment. Boredom and acquisitiveness become the principle markers of this new form of capitalism, which provides a rationale, or a new value set for the perpetual oscillation between the two poles, producing an insatiable desire for both objects and a continuing stream of fresh and intense experience. Perhaps the most densely argued assessment of capitalism, whose obvious parallel would be Marx’s Capital, is the two volumes by Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. With all the concern over the theoretical concepts developed in these books, it remains extremely important to understand the analysis as possessing a fundamental focus on the question of political economy. Capitalism forms, via its structural and affective matrix, a system capable of unparalleled cruelty and terror,

and even though certain indices of well being have increased, “exploitation grows constantly harsher, (and) lack is arranged in the most scientiﬁc ways” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 373). Their framework for analysis targets the global, where the deepest law of capitalism sets limits and then repels those limits, a process well known as the concept of deterrorialization. Capitalism functions, then, by incessantly increasing the portion of constant capital, a deceptively concise formulation that has tremendous resonance for the organization of the planet – resources continually pour into the technological and machinic apparatus of capture and control, to the increased exclusion of the human component (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 466–7). In other words, it not only thrives on crisis but one of the principle deﬁnitions of capitalism would be to continually induce crisis; nostalgia for a “lost Sado-Monetarism or Saint Fond-Saint Ford 109 time” only drives these processes. The planet confronts the fourth danger, the most violent and destructive of tendencies, characterized as a turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 229). Deleuze and Guattari make clear this fourth danger does not translate as a death drive, because for them desire is “always assembled,” a creation and a composition; here the task of thinking becomes to address the processes of composition. The current assemblage, then, has mutated from its original organization of total war, which has been surpassed “toward a form of peace more terrifying still,” the “peace of Terror or Survival” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 433). Accordingly, the worldwide war machine has entered a post fascist phase, where Clausewitz has been dislocated, and this war machine now targets the entire world, its peoples and economies. An “unspeciﬁed enemy” becomes the continual feedback loop for this war machine, which had been originally constituted by states, but which has now shifted into a planetary, and perhaps interstellar mode, with a seemingly insatiable drive to organize insecurity, increase machinic enslavement, and produce a “peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467).7 Deleuze has analyzed these tendencies extensively in his own work, in particular with his dissection of active and reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche but also in his work on Sade and Masoch, where he points to a type of sadism that seems capable of attempting a “perpetually effective crime,” to not only destroy (pro)creation but to prevent it from ever happening again, a total and perpetual destruction, one produced by a pervasive odium fati, a hatred of fate that seeks absolute revenge in destroying life and any possible recurrence. (Deleuze, 1989: 37). This tendency far outstrips what Robert Jay Lifton has described as the “Armageddonists,” in their more commonly analyzed religious variant and in what he calls the secular type, both of which see the possibility of a “world cleansing,” preparing the way for a new world order, be it religious or otherwise (Lifton, 1987: 5–9). Embedded within the immanence of capitalism, then, one can ﬁnd forces which would make fascism seem like “child precursors,” and Hitler’s infamous Telegram 71 would be applied to all of existence, perpetually. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467). One ﬁnal complication in terms of currently emerging subjectivities, the well-known analysis in Anti-Oedipus where capitalism, as basically driven by a certain fundamental insanity, oscillates between “two poles of delirium, one as the molecular schizophrenic line of escape, and the other as paranoiac molar investment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 315).8 These two markers offer dramatically different possibilities for the issues of subjectivities and agency, and questions of consumption and the political can be posed within their dense and complex oscillations.

## Case

### 1NC — State

#### **Locating the state as a variable of analysis is key to organize collective action-the aff gets coopted and individual radicalism fails**

Bayat, Sociology Prof @ University of Illinois, 13

(Asef, Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, pp. 41-45)

The dearth of conventional collective action— in par tic u lar, contentious protests among the subaltern groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the developing countries, together with a disillusionment with dominant socialist parties, pushed many radical observers to “discover” and highlight different types of activism, however small- scale, local, or even individualistic. Such a quest, meanwhile, both contributed to and benefi ted from the upsurge of theoretical perspectives, during the 1980s, associated with poststructuralism that made micropolitics and “everyday resistance” a popular idea. James Scott’s departure, during the 1980s, from a structuralist position in studying the behavior of the peasantry in Asia to a more ethnographic method of focusing on individual reactions of peasants contributed considerably to this paradigm shift .27 In the meantime, Foucault’s “decentered” notion of power, together with a revival of neo- Gramscian politics of culture (hegemony), served as a key theoretical backing for micropolitics, and thus the “re sis tance” perspective. The notion of “re sis tance” came to stress that power and counterpower were not in binary opposition, but in a decoupled, complex, ambivalent, and perpetual “dance of control.”28 It based itself on the Foucauldian idea that “wherever there is power there is re sis tance,” although the latter consisted largely of small- scale, everyday, tiny activities that the agents could aff ord to articulate given their po liti cal constraints. Such a perception of re sis tance penetrated not only peasant studies, but a variety of fi elds, including labor studies, identity politics, ethnicity, women’s studies, education, and studies of the urban subaltern. Thus, multiple researchers discussed how relating stories about miracles “gives voice to pop u lar re sis tance”29; how disenfranchised women resisted patriarchy by relating folktales and songs or by pretending to be possessed or crazy;30 how reviving extended family among the urban pop u lar classes represented an “avenue of po liti cal participation.”31 The relationships between the Filipino bar girls and western men were discussed not simply in terms of total domination, but in a complex and contingent fashion;32 and the veiling of the Muslim working woman has been represented not in simple terms of submission, but in ambivalent terms of protest and co- optation— hence, an “accommodating protest.”33 Indeed, on occasions, both veiling and unveiling were simultaneously considered as a symbol of re sis tance. Undoubtedly, such an attempt to grant agency to the subjects that until then were depicted as “passive poor,” “submissive women,” “apo liti cal peasant,” and “oppressed worker” was a positive development. The re sis tance paradigm helps to uncover the complexity of power relations in society in general, and the politics of the subaltern in par tic u lar. It tells us that we may not expect a universalized form of struggle; that totalizing pictures oft en distort variations in people’s perceptions about change; that local should be recognized as a signifi cant site of struggle as well as a unit of analysis; that or ga nized collective action may not be possible everywhere, and thus alternative forms of struggles must be discovered and acknowledged; that or ganized protest as such may not necessarily be privileged in the situations where suppression rules. The value of a more fl exible, small- scale, and unbureaucratic activism should, therefore, be acknowledged.34 These are some of the issues that critiques of poststructuralist advocates of “re sis tance” ignore.35 Yet a number of conceptual and political problems also emerge from this paradigm. The immediate trouble is how to conceptualize re sis tance, and its relation to power, domination, and submission. James Scott seems to be clear about what he means by the term: Class re sis tance includes any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à- vis these superordinate classes.36 [emphasis added] However, the phrase “any act” blocks delineating between qualitatively diverse forms of activities that Scott lists. Are we not to distinguish between large- scale collective action and individual acts, say, of tax dodging? Do reciting poetry in private, however subversive- sounding, and engaging in armed struggle have identical value? Should we not expect unequal aff ectivity and implications from such diff erent acts? Scott was aware of this, and so agreed with those who had made distinctions between diff erent types of resistance— for example, “real re sis tance” refers to “or ga nized, systematic, pre- planned or selfl ess practices with revolutionary consequences,” and “token re sis tance” points to unor ga nized incidental acts without any revolutionary consequences, and which are accommodated in the power structure.37 Yet he insisted that the “token re sis tance” is no less real than the “real re sis tance.” Scott’s followers, however, continued to make further distinctions. Nathan Brown, in studying peasant politics in Egypt, for instance, identifi es three forms of politics: atomistic (politics of individuals and small groups with obscure content), communal (a group eff ort to disrupt the system, by slowing down production and the like), and revolt ( just short of revolution to negate the system).38 Beyond this, many resistance writers tend to confuse an awareness about oppression with acts of resistance against it. The fact that poor women sing songs about their plight or ridicule men in their private gatherings indicates their understanding of gender dynamics. This does not mean, however, that they are involved in acts of resistance; neither are the miracle stories of the poor urbanites who imagine the saints to come and punish the strong. Such an understanding of “resistance” fails to capture the extremely complex interplay of conflict and consent, and ideas and action, operating within systems of power. Indeed, the link between consciousness and action remains a major sociological dilemma.39 Scott makes it clear that re sis tance is an intentional act. In Weberian tradition, he takes the meaning of action as a crucial element. This intentionality, while signifi cant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual and collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond. In Cairo or Tehran, for example, many poor families illegally tap into electricity and running water from the municipality despite their awareness of their behavior’s illegality. Yet they do not steal urban ser vices in order to express their defi ance vis-à- vis the authorities. Rather, they do it because they feel the necessity of those ser vices for a decent life, because they fi nd no other way to acquire them. But these very mundane acts when continued lead to signifi cant changes in the urban structure, in social policy, and in the actors’ own lives. Hence, the signifi cance of the unintended consequences of agents’ daily activities. In fact, many authors in the re sis tance paradigm have simply abandoned intent and meaning, focusing instead eclectically on both intended and unintended practices as manifestations of “re sis tance.” There is still a further question. Does re sis tance mean defending an already achieved gain (in Scott’s terms, denying claims made by dominant groups over the subordinate ones) or making fresh demands (to “advance its own claims”), what I like to call “encroachment”? In much of the re sis tance literature, this distinction is missing. Although one might imagine moments of overlap, the two strategies, however, lead to diff erent po liti cal consequences; this is so in par tic u lar when we view them in relation to the strategies of dominant power. The issue was so crucial that Lenin devoted his entire What Is to Be Done? to discussing the implications of these two strategies, albeit in diff erent terms of “economism/trade unionism” vs. “social demo cratic/party politics.” What ever one may think about a Leninist/vanguardist paradigm, it was one that corresponded to a par tic u lar theory of the state and power (a capitalist state to be seized by a mass movement led by the working- class party); in addition, it was clear where this strategy wanted to take the working class (to establish a socialist state). Now, what is the perception of the state in the “resistance” paradigm? What is the strategic aim in this perspective? Where does the resistance paradigm want to take its agents/subjects, beyond “prevent[ing] the worst and promis[ing] something better”?40 Much of the literature of re sis tance is based upon a notion of power that Foucault has articulated, that power is everywhere, that it “circulates” and is never “localized here and there, never in anybody’s hands.” 41 Such a formulation is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the ordinary and in recognizing their agency. Yet this “decentered” notion of power, shared by many poststructuralist “re sis tance” writers, underestimates state power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to see that although power circulates, it does so unevenly— in some places it is far weightier, more concentrated, and “thicker,” so to speak, than in others. In other words, like it or not, the state does matter, and one needs to take that into account when discussing the potential of urban subaltern activism. Although Foucault insists that re sis tance is real when it occurs outside of and in de pen dent of the systems of power, the perception of power that informs the “re sis tance” literature leaves little room for an analysis of the state as a system of power. It is, therefore, not accidental that a theory of the state and, therefore, an analysis of the possibility of co- optation, are absent in almost all accounts of “resistance.” Consequently, the cherished acts of resistance float around aimlessly in an unknown, uncertain, and ambivalent universe of power relations, with the end result an unsettled, tense accommodation with the existing power arrangement. Lack of a clear concept of resistance, moreover, often leads writers in this genre to overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result is that almost any act of the subjects potentially becomes one of “resistance.” Determined to discover the “inevitable” acts of resistance, many poststructuralist writers often come to “replace their subject.”42 While they attempt to challenge the essentialism of such perspectives as “passive poor,” “submissive Muslim women,” and “inactive masses,” they tend, however, to fall into the trap of essentialism in reverse— by reading too much into ordinary behaviors, interpreting them as necessarily conscious or contentious acts of defi ance. This is so because they overlook the crucial fact that these practices occur mostly within the prevailing systems of power. For example, some of the lower class’s activities in the Middle East that some authors read as “re sis tance,” “intimate politics” of defi ance, or “avenues of participation” may actually contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the state.43 The fact that people are able to help themselves and extend their networks surely shows their daily activism and struggles. However, by doing so the actors may hardly win any space from the state (or other sources of power, like capital and patriarchy)— they are not necessarily challenging domination. In fact, governments often encourage self- help and local initiatives so long as they do not turn oppositional. They do so in order to shift some of their burdens of social welfare provision and responsibilities onto the individual citizens. The proliferation of many NGOs in the global South is a good indicator of this. In short, much of the re sis tance literature confuses what one might consider coping strategies (when the survival of the agents is secured at the cost of themselves or that of fellow humans) and effective participation or subversion of domination. There is a last question. If the poor are always able to resist in many ways (by discourse or actions, individual or collective, overt or covert) the systems of domination, then what is the need to assist them? If they are already po litically able citizens, why should we expect the state or any other agency to empower them? Misreading the behavior of the poor may, in fact, frustrate our moral responsibility toward the vulnerable. As Michael Brown rightly notes, when you “elevate the small injuries of childhood to the same moral status as suff ering of truly oppressed,” you are committing “a savage leveling that diminishes rather than intensifi es our sensitivities to injustice.” 44

### 1NC — Solvency

#### Debate cannot create social change

Ritter 13. JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### Performance fails – it gets coopted by the audience and becomes valueless

Phelan 1996 —chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146-9)

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to thelaws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present. The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between the art object and the viewer. While such exchanges are often recorded as the stated goals of museums and galleries, the institutional effect of the gallery often seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest, controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—only lends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art object and the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistant to the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if there production is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memory forget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personal meanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting (or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptive recovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. The descriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generates recovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers. The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same (the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animal with whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. The mimicry of speech and writing, the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established. Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it. Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward. Writing about it necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength. But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing about performance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls in behind the drive of the document/ary. Performance’s challenge to writingis to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than, as Benveniste warned, constative utterances.

### 1NC — Turn

#### The affs reliance on futurity turns and dooms it to fail. Possibility begins from the starting point that all of this must end. Social and political life is parasitic on anti-black and queer death.

Dillon 13 [Stephen, Prof. Queer Studies @ Hampshire College, “‘It’s here, it’s that time:’ Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in *Born in Flames*,” *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* vol. 23 no. 1,pp. 45-7//ak]

In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end. In her writing from captivity, Angela Davis articulates this logic in relationship to the prison. In the 1971 essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis argues that the sole purpose of the police was to “intimidate blacks” and “to persuade us with their violence that we are powerless to alter the conditions of our lives” (39). Davis theorizes the violence of police and prisons as pervasive and unrelenting. Throughout the essay, Davis names the complicity between an anti-blackness as old as liberal freedom and new forms of penal and policing technologies that emerged in the 1970s in response to political upheaval and insurrection. Davis calls for the abolition of what she terms the “law-enforcement-judicial-penal network” in addition to arguing for the construction of a mass movement that could contest the “victory of fascism” (50). Yet, in line with the political imaginaries at the time – an imaginary articulated by Born In Flames – Davis wanted more than an end to the prison and the violence of the police. Like other early black feminist writing, Davis did not just call for the overthrow of one form of state power so that a new one may take its place. Instead, Davis implied that the social order itself must be undone. For Davis, the prison was not the primary problem. The prison was made possible by the libidinal, symbolic, and discursive regimes that actualized the uneven institutionalized distribution of value and disposability along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality. Davis called for the total epistemological and ontological undoing of the forms of knowledge and subjectivity that were produced by the racial state. In short, hope, for Davis, meant that the prison could not have a future, and more so, that a world that could have the prison would need to end as well. Critically, Jackson did not understand the end of the future of the social order as particularly different from his present because “I’ve lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief” (1972, 7). Jackson’s understanding of the future arose from his critique of reform. Derived from his correspondence with Davis, Jackson argued that the essence of fascism was reform or more specifically “economic reform” (118).11 Every reform that modified or improved the operations of global capitalism and white supremacy only extended the life of the social order. And the life of the social order, according to Jackson and Fanon, is parasitic on the control, exploitation, incarceration, and premature death of black people. The creation of a new world could not rely on “long term politics” because patience, reform, and change meant nothing to “the person who expects to die tomorrow” (10). For Jackson, the future is a time those without a future cannot risk. The future was not coming and so the present could not wait.

#### Worldbuilding means the aff fails

Moten and Harney 20, Fred Moten is a professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has previously taught at the University of California Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa. Stefano Harney was a former professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 7-23-2020, “Talk with Fred Moten and Stefano Harney”, [7/30/2020], transcribed mainly by Claire Anderson McElligott, https://www.dropbox.com/s/s6qd3pbhragzt7n/Talk%20w%20Moten%20Harney.mp4?dl=0 /EH

Fred Moten: Sorry – I just wanted to say one other thing. We just – there’s another big, you know, there’s an essay floating around on the internet now, um, and I’m not even, I usually don’t like to just sort of call, dog people out. Um, but I, but I will mention the name of the person who wrote it because I, and to say, if, you know, that I disagree with, with it in profound ways is, um, you know an – a person whose work I have, um, admired and gained a lot from, um, and who has been a crucial voice in thinking through and establishing in a certain kind of way a discourse around prison, around, around, around, let’s say, the status and the intellectual work of the figure of the political prisoner. Okay? Um, maybe she probably wouldn’t at this stage of the game, at least, call herself a prison abolitionist now. Anyway, her name is Joy James. She teaches at Williams College. And she just wrote, uh, an essay, I think it’s called something like Airbrushing Revolution, or, Abolitionism’s Airbrushing of Revolution, or something like that. And, um, some of this has to do with something that our former, or our, uh, I’ll say mentor, you know, is, uh, named Chandler, used to say or probably still does say around, um, the term he likes to use paleonomy. Which is, for him, you know, the use of old words. Right? The refusal to, to relinquish certain words. Okay, now part of what Joy James is doing is she’s doing a kind of, it’s a version I was talking about at the beginning of let’s kinda, uh, really fight hard about the 1% that we disagree on kinda work, you know? And in this instance, she wants to articulate, she wants to say that in a certain sense abolitionism has become, is, is, is being used to overturn or to undermine the necessity of revolution. As if revolution implies a kind of totality that abolitionism doesn’t, doesn’t approach. Okay? And I think part of what’s at stake is the relative ease with which the term abolition can be taken up by people who, a minute before, would never have said it, or would’ve radically disavowed it. It’s an interesting phenomenon, because, of course, the term abolition, we know, has an earlier history, and wasn’t simply related to prison. Before that, the primary use of the term abolition in this country we used, was in regards to slavery. And I think many of the people who’ve decided to deploy that term, abolition, vis a vis prison deployed it precisely because they saw prison abolition as an extension of the unfinished project of the abolition of slavery. Right? And this goes right back to the ways that, you know, slavery is in a certain sense extended by the very legal mechanisms which were supposed to have brought slavery to an end, right? Namely the 13th Amendment, right? And, you know there’s books and films and so forth that I’m sure you all know about. Um, the thing I guess I would wanna say and I think Joy James is sort of saying this, the primary work of prison abolition and the primary people who have engaged in prison abolition are prisoners. Just like the primary work of the abolition of slavery was engaged in by the enslaved. And it was engaged in, not strictly at the level of a set of rhetorical stances and demands, okay? Although, the rhetorical stances and demands that were made by the formerly enslaved or even by the enslaved or even by people who were speaking on behalf of the enslaved were totally important! Right? Frederick Douglass’s abolitionist work isn’t any less important because he did most of it when he wasn’t enslaved. Okay? It – but it does bear repeating and emphasis that the primary work of abolition was done by the enslaved, and it was done not in the making of speeches, not in the striking of political stances, but in the common practices of life that they engaged in that made it possible for them to survive. Both to survive chattel slavery, but also to survive in chattel slavery. Do you understand? Okay. So. That’s part of what I think Ruth Gilmore means when she says abolitionism is something that involves the presencing of something rather than the absenting of something. It’s what we do in our practices. Okay? And this gets back to the other question that somebody raised about the, the kind of logic and the structure of the demand. The demand for abolition is… necessary and important. But, the statement of that demand has to always be accompanied by and in a certain sense grounded in the practice of that demand. And the practice of that demand is the presencing of the alternative. And, and, and the alternative, well, that’s another que- so, so, so, I’m just saying this in echo of Stefano because it’s also gotta be about, like, shit we do. And we talk about fucking shit up it’s like, well, there’s just some basic shit at the level of our everyday practices, the, the, the small micro shit that we control. Because, yes, the man is coming, the police are here, they’re, they’re they’re coming, okay, they’re already here and they’re going to come and try to keep you from doing, you know? But, but, but the first thing is to be able to identify what it is that we actually have something like a kind of control over in our practices. And to engage with that. To, to, and first, to want that. To identify it, but also to want it. To not imagine that it is degraded simply because it is a function of our present condition. But, you know, so, all of those things have to be… you know, um, look, if we ever had any big argument with Frank [Wilderson] and them, the argument was right here. You know, because the question is, well, you know. If, if, if the overturning of antiblackness is tantamount to the end of the world, which he articulates and which I think we both agree with, that still raises the question of, okay, he says, it, it, for him, for Frank [Wilderson], he says this places no ethical demand or intellectual demand on me to say what the alternative to this world would be. And I think maybe what we would say is, you can’t simply opt out of that ethical demand. Because, because what it raises, because, because the question of the alternative to this world emerges before the end of, right? [laughter] of it. It emerges before the end of it. And, and what’s at stake then is, like this, is like, it emerges, I think, immediately around this question: if what you want is the end of this world, does that mean you want another world? And that raises some questions about ‘world’. Okay? Which is to say, you understand? That raises some general questions. That raises some specific questions about this world but it also raises a general question about the very idea and concept of ‘world’. So if you read Eugene Genovese, uh, uh, Roll Jordan World, or, or read his books about the world the slaves made, okay? That, that implies something. It implies something that we should disagree with, I think. I don’t think the slaves made a world, right? I mean James William Johnson is great and beautiful, but when he has a black god say I think I’ll make me a world, that’s still a problematic expression of sovereignty. What if worldmaking is not our province?

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What if worldmaking wasn’t actually the practice that, the abolitionist practice that the enslaved were… in other words what if their abolitionist practice was against the very idea of world, right? These are, these are, you know. And that means, that means, you know, that neither the end of this world nor the advent of another world absolves us from actually paying attention to the practice of worldlessness, right? [laughter] that the enslaved made, or engaged in. And not just a practice of worldlessness, but the promise of worldlessness. The, the practice and the promise of the unworldly. Which is different than the otherworldly.

Stefano Harney: Yeah, yeah, yeah and I think you can hear in some of what we’re saying, the whole necessity that you find in Cedric Robin’s work and Black Marxism in terms of order, that you find in Cabral’s work, really that you find in African Marxism, that you find in much of the Latin American left historically, is, how, how can, how can we oppose this world without simply producing a new world? I mean, you know the traditional critiques of what’s now called, you know, the white left. And you know all the, the, the kind of tropes of it, you know, the, the kid who sits there and you’re talking about, you know, doing something about seeds or gardens or something and he says how are we gonna scale this up. Right? How are we gonna scale this up. Right? He’s worlding, right, he’s talking about, you know, or, um, those, those people over there, they need to get into coalition with us, they have to stop doing what they’re doing over there and be in coalition with us cause we’re building a new world cause another world is possible. And on and on, right? You know that whole discourse, right? Well, that whole discourse is not the discourse of black radical thought, right? Whether you’re talking about Frank [Wilderson]’s work where he clearly rejects that, or whether you’re talking about Cedric’s work where he’s completely interested in alternatives to worlds, and things don’t add up in terms of what Fred’s calling worldlessness. And, you know, in the, in the, in a form of social life where you’re always giving away your home, in a form of social life in which we are, as, as Denise Ferra Da Silva says, different but inseparable. Um, that we live in a world of difference without separability. Um, and that, you know, we have a long tradition to draw on, we have nothing to be… we have nothing but riches when it comes to that. And it’s unfortunately necessary to, to, to, to, to claim this in the face of people who somehow want you to do more. You know, why aren’t you building the new world and why aren’t you building the party, you know? Um, why aren’t you joining, you know, this or that. well, we have a reason. You know? That we’re not doing some of those things. And reasons that we’re doing some other stuff. So, yeah. I’m just, I’m just repeating what Fred says which is not what we should be doing, I should be, I should be addressing something else. I was just looking at the questions again, uh, sorry for the delay, but I remember also again, um, being immediately hit by the question on exodus, right? And I think the person who raised that question, um, uh, sort of asked, you know, have we had a kind of change of position because earlier on we were talking about sort of disrupting, sabotaging the assembly line and yet more recently in this, um, university piece, uh it seems like we’re talking about walking away. Uh, an exodus. I’m sure that, uh hopefully our stuff is changing as we talk with more people like yourselves, and, uh, as we’re getting smarter about things, but the thing that probably ties it together in what we were trying to say when we were speaking to the university students who invited us for that piece, is, uh, there’s a lot of stuff that we can take with us when we go. Right? Most of what we understand as the means of production is still housed in us. Maybe more than ever. And not in us individually but collectively. And, when you walk from an institution, under those circumstances, you are sabotaging it. Cause it can’t go on without you. Um, whether it’s a hospital, whether it’s’ a school, whether it’s a prison, whether it’s’ a university, whether it’s the state itself. But it’s not like walking away in the sense of just dropping it and leaving it behind. It’s bringing out a certain kind of sociality that was forged in the struggle of being there. And seeing whether it’s of any use to us or whether it is a kind of… the kind of machine or the kind of technology that, because it was forged in worldmaking, can only make worlds. But I think we don’t know that until we’re in practice. We have to have the strength to realize that we don’t need these institutions to do whatever we think is worthwhile about them. Health in a hospital, uh, teaching in a university, whatever the case may be. Security in the state, uh, whatever kind of thing we can’t quite shake. But the main reason we don’t need em is we should intend to take all that collective capacity with us. That’s, that’s what an exodus is. Is, it’s about taking, um, that which has greatest value to capital, uh, to the state, and finding out if it has any value to us. I suspect a lot of that shit doesn’t, you know? But so long as it's bound up in their production processes and in their assembly lines, uh, we, we won’t know what we can do with it. This seems like more than ever the case with the university. Um, you know there’s sort of no longer really any reason to cooperate with it. Um, it’s pretty clear that it does nothing but make a war on us. A war on those of us inside of it and those of us who are outside of it. And subject to it. And as the kind of propaganda wing of this larger war, um, we just need to start to do without it. Um, and yet, the point I think with exodus is that none of that should represent a loss for us. And potentially, represent a way to actually begin collective practice and collective life outside of the… totality. The other day, we had this collective we work with, um, called the Mardi Gras listening collective. And basically it’s a group of us who just listen to music and share music and talk about it. And it’s, it’s kind of the, one of the most enjoyable collectives I’ve ever been in because we don’t really put that much pressure on ourselves but somehow by not putting that pressure on us we realize more of the life we want than when we, I used to sit down in these more earnest collectives and say, okay, how am I going to forge a new world, or whatever. And the other day, one of our, our friends in that group, he said you know what we need to do? We need to wildcat the totality. And it’s kind of a great phrase, because it means on the one hand the sabotaging of a totality, of a world. And on on the other hand, it means that we need to do that from anywhere, anytime, together. We can’t be waiting for authorization, so called organization, uh, certainly not leadership. Um, you know, we need to wildcat all this shit right now. And, um, we will discover what wealth we have for this alternative to world that I, that I think we need to live.

# 2NC

## K

# 1NR

## FW

## Case

#### Finishing

Moten and Harney 20, Fred Moten is a professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has previously taught at the University of California Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa. Stefano Harney was a former professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 7-23-2020, “Talk with Fred Moten and Stefano Harney”, [7/30/2020], transcribed mainly by Claire Anderson McElligott, https://www.dropbox.com/s/s6qd3pbhragzt7n/Talk%20w%20Moten%20Harney.mp4?dl=0 /EH

Fred Moten: Sorry – I just wanted to say one other thing. We just – there’s another big, you know, there’s an essay floating around on the internet now, um, and I’m not even, I usually don’t like to just sort of call, dog people out. Um, but I, but I will mention the name of the person who wrote it because I, and to say, if, you know, that I disagree with, with it in profound ways is, um, you know an – a person whose work I have, um, admired and gained a lot from, um, and who has been a crucial voice in thinking through and establishing in a certain kind of way a discourse around prison, around, around, around, let’s say, the status and the intellectual work of the figure of the political prisoner. Okay? Um, maybe she probably wouldn’t at this stage of the game, at least, call herself a prison abolitionist now. Anyway, her name is Joy James. She teaches at Williams College. And she just wrote, uh, an essay, I think it’s called something like Airbrushing Revolution, or, Abolitionism’s Airbrushing of Revolution, or something like that. And, um, some of this has to do with something that our former, or our, uh, I’ll say mentor, you know, is, uh, named Chandler, used to say or probably still does say around, um, the term he likes to use paleonomy. Which is, for him, you know, the use of old words. Right? The refusal to, to relinquish certain words. Okay, now part of what Joy James is doing is she’s doing a kind of, it’s a version I was talking about at the beginning of let’s kinda, uh, really fight hard about the 1% that we disagree on kinda work, you know? And in this instance, she wants to articulate, she wants to say that in a certain sense abolitionism has become, is, is, is being used to overturn or to undermine the necessity of revolution. As if revolution implies a kind of totality that abolitionism doesn’t, doesn’t approach. Okay? And I think part of what’s at stake is the relative ease with which the term abolition can be taken up by people who, a minute before, would never have said it, or would’ve radically disavowed it. It’s an interesting phenomenon, because, of course, the term abolition, we know, has an earlier history, and wasn’t simply related to prison. Before that, the primary use of the term abolition in this country we used, was in regards to slavery. And I think many of the people who’ve decided to deploy that term, abolition, vis a vis prison deployed it precisely because they saw prison abolition as an extension of the unfinished project of the abolition of slavery. Right? And this goes right back to the ways that, you know, slavery is in a certain sense extended by the very legal mechanisms which were supposed to have brought slavery to an end, right? Namely the 13th Amendment, right? And, you know there’s books and films and so forth that I’m sure you all know about. Um, the thing I guess I would wanna say and I think Joy James is sort of saying this, the primary work of prison abolition and the primary people who have engaged in prison abolition are prisoners. Just like the primary work of the abolition of slavery was engaged in by the enslaved. And it was engaged in, not strictly at the level of a set of rhetorical stances and demands, okay? Although, the rhetorical stances and demands that were made by the formerly enslaved or even by the enslaved or even by people who were speaking on behalf of the enslaved were totally important! Right? Frederick Douglass’s abolitionist work isn’t any less important because he did most of it when he wasn’t enslaved. Okay? It – but it does bear repeating and emphasis that the primary work of abolition was done by the enslaved, and it was done not in the making of speeches, not in the striking of political stances, but in the common practices of life that they engaged in that made it possible for them to survive. Both to survive chattel slavery, but also to survive in chattel slavery. Do you understand? Okay. So. That’s part of what I think Ruth Gilmore means when she says abolitionism is something that involves the presencing of something rather than the absenting of something. It’s what we do in our practices. Okay? And this gets back to the other question that somebody raised about the, the kind of logic and the structure of the demand. The demand for abolition is… necessary and important. But, the statement of that demand has to always be accompanied by and in a certain sense grounded in the practice of that demand. And the practice of that demand is the presencing of the alternative. And, and, and the alternative, well, that’s another que- so, so, so, I’m just saying this in echo of Stefano because it’s also gotta be about, like, shit we do. And we talk about fucking shit up it’s like, well, there’s just some basic shit at the level of our everyday practices, the, the, the small micro shit that we control. Because, yes, the man is coming, the police are here, they’re, they’re they’re coming, okay, they’re already here and they’re going to come and try to keep you from doing, you know? But, but, but the first thing is to be able to identify what it is that we actually have something like a kind of control over in our practices. And to engage with that. To, to, and first, to want that. To identify it, but also to want it. To not imagine that it is degraded simply because it is a function of our present condition. But, you know, so, all of those things have to be… you know, um, look, if we ever had any big argument with Frank [Wilderson] and them, the argument was right here. You know, because the question is, well, you know. If, if, if the overturning of antiblackness is tantamount to the end of the world, which he articulates and which I think we both agree with, that still raises the question of, okay, he says, it, it, for him, for Frank [Wilderson], he says this places no ethical demand or intellectual demand on me to say what the alternative to this world would be. And I think maybe what we would say is, you can’t simply opt out of that ethical demand. Because, because what it raises, because, because the question of the alternative to this world emerges before the end of, right? [laughter] of it. It emerges before the end of it. And, and what’s at stake then is, like this, is like, it emerges, I think, immediately around this question: if what you want is the end of this world, does that mean you want another world? And that raises some questions about ‘world’. Okay? Which is to say, you understand? That raises some general questions. That raises some specific questions about this world but it also raises a general question about the very idea and concept of ‘world’. So if you read Eugene Genovese, uh, uh, Roll Jordan World, or, or read his books about the world the slaves made, okay? That, that implies something. It implies something that we should disagree with, I think. I don’t think the slaves made a world, right? I mean James William Johnson is great and beautiful, but when he has a black god say I think I’ll make me a world, that’s still a problematic expression of sovereignty. What if worldmaking is not our province? What if worldmaking wasn’t actually the practice that, the abolitionist practice that the enslaved were… in other words what if their abolitionist practice was against the very idea of world, right? These are, these are, you know. And that means, that means, you know, that neither the end of this world nor the advent of another world absolves us from actually paying attention to the practice of worldlessness, right? [laughter] that the enslaved made, or engaged in. And not just a practice of worldlessness, but the promise of worldlessness. The, the practice and the promise of the unworldly. Which is different than the otherworldly.

Stefano Harney: Yeah, yeah, yeah and I think you can hear in some of what we’re saying, the whole necessity that you find in Cedric Robin’s work and Black Marxism in terms of order, that you find in Cabral’s work, really that you find in African Marxism, that you find in much of the Latin American left historically, is, how, how can, how can we oppose this world without simply producing a new world? I mean, you know the traditional critiques of what’s now called, you know, the white left. And you know all the, the, the kind of tropes of it, you know, the, the kid who sits there and you’re talking about, you know, doing something about seeds or gardens or something and he says how are we gonna scale this up. Right? How are we gonna scale this up. Right? He’s worlding, right, he’s talking about, you know, or, um, those, those people over there, they need to get into coalition with us, they have to stop doing what they’re doing over there and be in coalition with us cause we’re building a new world cause another world is possible. And on and on, right? You know that whole discourse, right? Well, that whole discourse is not the discourse of black radical thought, right? Whether you’re talking about Frank [Wilderson]’s work where he clearly rejects that, or whether you’re talking about Cedric’s work where he’s completely interested in alternatives to worlds, and things don’t add up in terms of what Fred’s calling worldlessness. And, you know, in the, in the, in a form of social life where you’re always giving away your home, in a form of social life in which we are, as, as Denise Ferra Da Silva says, different but inseparable. Um, that we live in a world of difference without separability. Um, and that, you know, we have a long tradition to draw on, we have nothing to be… we have nothing but riches when it comes to that. And it’s unfortunately necessary to, to, to, to, to claim this in the face of people who somehow want you to do more

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. You know, why aren’t you building the new world and why aren’t you building the party, you know? Um, why aren’t you joining, you know, this or that. well, we have a reason. You know? That we’re not doing some of those things. And reasons that we’re doing some other stuff. So, yeah. I’m just, I’m just repeating what Fred says which is not what we should be doing, I should be, I should be addressing something else. I was just looking at the questions again, uh, sorry for the delay, but I remember also again, um, being immediately hit by the question on exodus, right? And I think the person who raised that question, um, uh, sort of asked, you know, have we had a kind of change of position because earlier on we were talking about sort of disrupting, sabotaging the assembly line and yet more recently in this, um, university piece, uh it seems like we’re talking about walking away. Uh, an exodus. I’m sure that, uh hopefully our stuff is changing as we talk with more people like yourselves, and, uh, as we’re getting smarter about things, but the thing that probably ties it together in what we were trying to say when we were speaking to the university students who invited us for that piece, is, uh, there’s a lot of stuff that we can take with us when we go. Right? Most of what we understand as the means of production is still housed in us. Maybe more than ever. And not in us individually but collectively. And, when you walk from an institution, under those circumstances, you are sabotaging it. Cause it can’t go on without you. Um, whether it’s a hospital, whether it’s’ a school, whether it’s a prison, whether it’s’ a university, whether it’s the state itself. But it’s not like walking away in the sense of just dropping it and leaving it behind. It’s bringing out a certain kind of sociality that was forged in the struggle of being there. And seeing whether it’s of any use to us or whether it is a kind of… the kind of machine or the kind of technology that, because it was forged in worldmaking, can only make worlds. But I think we don’t know that until we’re in practice. We have to have the strength to realize that we don’t need these institutions to do whatever we think is worthwhile about them. Health in a hospital, uh, teaching in a university, whatever the case may be. Security in the state, uh, whatever kind of thing we can’t quite shake. But the main reason we don’t need em is we should intend to take all that collective capacity with us. That’s, that’s what an exodus is. Is, it’s about taking, um, that which has greatest value to capital, uh, to the state, and finding out if it has any value to us. I suspect a lot of that shit doesn’t, you know? But so long as it's bound up in their production processes and in their assembly lines, uh, we, we won’t know what we can do with it. This seems like more than ever the case with the university. Um, you know there’s sort of no longer really any reason to cooperate with it. Um, it’s pretty clear that it does nothing but make a war on us. A war on those of us inside of it and those of us who are outside of it. And subject to it. And as the kind of propaganda wing of this larger war, um, we just need to start to do without it. Um, and yet, the point I think with exodus is that none of that should represent a loss for us. And potentially, represent a way to actually begin collective practice and collective life outside of the… totality. The other day, we had this collective we work with, um, called the Mardi Gras listening collective. And basically it’s a group of us who just listen to music and share music and talk about it. And it’s, it’s kind of the, one of the most enjoyable collectives I’ve ever been in because we don’t really put that much pressure on ourselves but somehow by not putting that pressure on us we realize more of the life we want than when we, I used to sit down in these more earnest collectives and say, okay, how am I going to forge a new world, or whatever. And the other day, one of our, our friends in that group, he said you know what we need to do? We need to wildcat the totality. And it’s kind of a great phrase, because it means on the one hand the sabotaging of a totality, of a world. And on on the other hand, it means that we need to do that from anywhere, anytime, together. We can’t be waiting for authorization, so called organization, uh, certainly not leadership. Um, you know, we need to wildcat all this shit right now. And, um, we will discover what wealth we have for this alternative to world that I, that I think we need to live.